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RECENT DECISIONS
BANKS

AND

BANKING-TREND

UNDER FEDERAL CRIMINAL STATUTES

TowXm'

CENTRALIZATION-RESPONSIBILITY

OF OFFICERS OF STATE BANKS

INSURED BY

FDIC.-The appellants, directors of nonmember state banks insured under
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, seek to reverse convictions upon
pleas of guilty to various indictments charging violation of Section 292, Title 12
of the United States Code. Section 592 makes it a criminal offense for any officer
or director of an insured bank to embezzle any of the assets of such bank or
make any false enteries in any of its books or reports with intent to defraud the
Federal Reserve System or the insured bank. This section originally extended
to officers of such banks only as were members of the Federal Reserve System,
but in 1935 it was amended to include all insured banks. The appellants seek to
reverse the convictions on the ground that the amendment is unconstitutional
and does not become effective to nonmember state banks unless the state
authorizes such bank to insure their deposits under the federal law. Held, judgment affirmed. Congress has the power to establish a national banking system
such as the Federal Reserve Banking System and the more recent Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation. And the power to create such institutions carries with it the power to preserve and protect them. Therefore, any fraud on an
insured bank which would tend to weaken the bank and the system is a fraud
which is punishable by federal law. The mere fact that a person may be subject
to both state and federal law does not exclude the federal government from
jurisdiction. Weir v. United States, 92 F. (2d) 634 (C.C.A. 7th, 1937). In
Doherty v. United States, 94 F. (2d) 495 (C.C.A. 8th, 1938), a conviction of
bank directors was affirmed under substantially the same fact situation.
The principal cases illustrate the present tendency of a return to centralized
banking. It will be remembered that on February 25, 1791 the First Bank of
The United States was incorporated which, by its charter, was to have exclusive
banking rights outside of the District of Columbia. The first bank was given
a twenty year charter, at the end of which time it was liquidated, and a
Second Bank of The United States incorporated. Public sentiment, however,
was against centralization and on July 16, 1832, President Jackson vetoed
the bill granting a recharter to the Second Bank. PAINE, BANKING LAWS 8-9.
This termination of the Second United States Bank led to the formation of
numerous state banks, and the era of "wild cat" banking. During this period
each state bank operated as an individual entity with each bank issuing its own
notes which were the only currency. Since these notes had to be shipped back
to the bank of origin a hopeless system of discounts resulted. It was inevitable
that some system of national banking result. This occurred with the passage of
the act of 1864, which created a system of national banks. It had already been
decided that Congress has the power to create a bank. McCulloch v. Maryland,
4 Wheat 316 (1819). And the act of 1864 creating national banks as agencies
of the federal government to provide a national currency was held constitutional.
Davis v. Elmira Savings Bank, 161 U.S. 275 (1896). The act gave national banks
the right to transact a banking business and all incidental powers necessary to
carry out such business. Charlotte First Nat. Bank v. National Exchange Bank,
92 U.S. 122 (1875). The "incidental powers necessary to carry out such business" was a. blanket privilege by which Congress progressively broadened the
field of activities. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Pottorff, 291 U.S. 245 (1934).
However, even the widened scope of the national banks proved inadequate during depressions since each national bank acted only for itself. ZOLLMANN, 2
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BANKS AND BANKING § 1031. The panic of 1907 resulted in the Federal Reserve
Act of 1913 (38 STAT. 251) which created 12 "bankers' banks" to stabilize the
hational banks. It was compulsory for national banks to join the Federal
Reserve System and optional on the part of state banks. Hiatt v. United States,
4 F. (2d) 374 (C.C.A. 7th, 1924). But a state bank which joined the Federal
Reserve System became subject to federal laws and punishable by the federal
government. Westfall v. United States, 274 U.S. 256, 47 S.Ct. 629 (1927). During the last few years the trend toward centralization has become more marked.
In 1930 an amendment to the act of 1864 gave national banks many of the privileges heretofore enjoyed only by state banks. City of Marion v. Sneeden, 291
U.S. 262 (1934). And by the act of June 16, 1933, as amended by the act of
August 23, 1935 [12 U.S.C.A. § 64(a) (1936), 48 STAT. 189 (1933), 49 STAT.
708 (1935)] the stockholders of national banks were relieved from the "superadded liability" which is still enforced against state banks in some states. But,
unlike the First United States Bank, the present centralization is not being
forced directly. State banks still have all the powers and rights originally
granted to them, but the national bank status offers additional inducements not
extended to state banks. Then too, a state bank which avails itself of federal
legislation must comply with two sets of laws, is subject to double examination
and reporting, and receives no more advantages than those granted to national
banks. It is not unlikely that many state banks will take advantage of the liberalized branch banking law under which a state bank may affiliate itself with
a national bank and continue operations as a branch of such national bank.
Roy C. PACKLER.

CORPORATIONS-STOCK TRANSFERs-CoNFLIcr OF LAWS AND THE APPLICATION
OF THE UNIFORM STOCK TRANSFER Acr.-The defendant, a resident of Minne-

sota, was the owner of a certificate of a beneficiary's interest representing 100
shares in the Standard Oil Shares, Inc., whose transfer agent was located in
New York City. The certificate contained a provision stating that it was transferable to a holder without indorsement. The certificate which was unindorsed
was lost in a public street in a city in Minnesota. On application a duplicate was
issued to the defendant, who furnished a bond on which the plaintiff was surety,
to hold the transfer agent harmless should the original certificate appear. The
lost certificate next appeared in the hands of one H who sold it to the B. Co. of
Chicago through the W. Co. of Minneapolis. B. Co. transferred it, and there were
subsequent transfers until it came into the hands of the H. Co., who presented
it to the transfer agent for transfer to its name on the books of the corporation.
The transfer agent refused to make the transfer, and the certificate was relayed
back from transferor to transferor, in accord with the stock exchange rules,
until it came back into the hands of W. Co., who presented it for transfer. The
transfer agent still refused to make the transfer upon advice from the defendant not to do so. W. Co. threatened to bring suit to compel the transfer on the
corporate books, and the plaintiff surety in order to prevent a lawsuit, which it
would eventually have to defend, and, to which, it believed, it had no defense,
bought the lost certificate. It then brought suit against the defendant for reimbursement. A verdict was directed in favor of the plaintiff. On appeal from an
order denying a new trial, held, brder reversed. A new trial must be had to
determine whether or not W. Co. was a holder in due course of the lost certificate. In the instant case the issue that confronted ihe court was the determination of the title to the lost unindorsied certificate which was in the hands of a

